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Abstract 
The cornerstone of the hierarchical approach is that there are some basic 
human needs which must be satisfied before non-basic needs come into the 
picture. The hierarchical structure of needs implies that the satisfaction of 
primary needs provides substantial increases to individual happiness 
compared to the subsequent satisfaction of secondary needs. This idea can 
be combined with the concept of comparison income which means that 
individuals compare rewards with individuals with similar characteristics.  
These two notions could provide additional explanations   of empirical findings 
indicating a positive relationship between income and happiness up to certain 
level of income. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The study of happiness and well-being and their relationship with economic 
variables was a relatively neglected research issue for most academic 
economists. With a few notable exceptions such as Easterlin (1974) and 
Scitovsky (1976), the dominant attitude of the economics academic 
community was that happiness was the subject matter of other social 
sciences, and mainly of psychology. However, in the last decade, an 
increasing number of economists have started to study the concept of 
happiness at both the microeconomic and the macroeconomic level. The 
recent increase of academic articles and books on happiness and economics 
is a clear manifestation of this current interest (see for instance, Alesina, Di 
Tella, & Mac Culloch, 2004;  Frey & Stutzer, 2000; Kenny, 1999; Oswald, 
1997; and for a general review of the literature, Frey & Stutzer 2002a, 2002b, 
and Layard, 2005a).  
One of the most important topics of happiness research is the study of 
the relationship between income and happiness levels. There have been 
many empirical studies which examine this relationship in many countries 
using a variety of micro- and macro-level data. There have also been studies 
that concentrate on international comparisons of happiness levels. One 
relatively common empirical finding is that substantial increases in real per 
capita income do not correspond to equivalent increases of individual 
happiness. Furthermore, some findings suggest that there is a negative 
correlation between real income and happiness levels (see for instance, 
Blanchflower & Oswald, 2004; Easterlin, 1974, 1995; Lane, 2000; Oswald, 
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1997; Wright, 2000). These empirical findings, termed usually as the 
happiness or the Easterlin paradox, are difficult to explain given that for most 
economists income has a constant positive impact on reported happiness 
Bruni, 2002, 2004; Phelps, 2001). As one would expect, a number of 
explanations have been suggested for this paradox. However, one might get 
an additional insight from the concepts of hierarchical needs and of 
comparison income.  
Human needs hierarchy is an old idea but its modern version originates 
from work in psychology (mainly Maslow, 1954). Its basic notion is that there 
are primary and secondary needs and that the secondary needs become 
important once the primary ones have been satisfied. It can be argued that 
income increases for lower income levels satisfy mostly basic needs. Thus, 
hierarchy might explain why additional increases in income do not have 
significant effects on reported happiness levels.  
The concept of comparison income is another idea which can also 
contribute to an explanation of the happiness paradox (Clark & Oswald, 
1996). The main thrust of the comparison income argument in the context of 
happiness research is that individuals do not extract much happiness from 
their absolute income but from their position relative to other people’s 
incomes. Thus, raising everybody’s income might not result in an increase of 
general happiness.   
 This chapter discusses the role of the above two notions in providing 
explanations for the observed happiness paradox and also of studies showing 
a positive relationship between income and happiness up to a certain level of 
income. With these in mind, the second section of the present work discusses 
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the empirical aspects of the relationship between income and happiness. The 
next section provides a brief presentation of the proposed explanations of the 
income - happiness paradox. Sections 4 and 5 examine the hierarchical 
formulation and the concept of comparison income and also the way that they 
can contribute to the better understanding of the income - happiness 
relationship. A concluding section closes the chapter. 
 
2. Income and Happiness 
 
Before we proceed to an examination of the relationship between income and 
happiness, a short discussion of the terms that are usually employed in the 
relevant literature is necessary.  In economic theory the term “utility” has no 
psychological meaning, but it refers to individual preferences. Thus, a utility 
function is a numerical representation of a preference ordering. However, in 
the recent literature on happiness and economics, the term “utility” is again 
related to the original Benthamite meaning of utility which refers to pleasure 
and satisfaction. In this sense, the term “total utility” is equivalent to the term 
“life satisfaction” that is more common in psychology (Clark and Oswald, 
1996). 
Furthermore, “life satisfaction” is often used interchangeably with 
“happiness”, although it has been argued that the former has an advantage 
over the latter, because it emphasizes the subjective nature of the concept 
(Easterlin, 2001).  
“Subjective well-being” is also another term perceived as synonymous 
to the previous two, but it is not only used for satisfaction with one's entire life 
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as a whole, but also for specific discomforts and passing moods (Veenhoven, 
2000).  In empirical work, reported subjective well-being is taken as a proxy 
measure for individual welfare and of happiness (Studger & Frey, 2010).  
Thus, in this chapter the terms “total utility”, “life satisfaction”, 
“subjective well-being”, and “happiness” are used interchangeably as it is the 
case in most recent studies. Finally, we also follow the standard definition in 
the relevant literature which conceives happiness as the degree to which 
someone evaluates positively the overall quality of his or her present 'life as a 
whole' (Veenhoven, 2000). 
Given that for many years most economists were not interested in 
concepts like well-being and happiness, research on happiness and its 
relation to economic variables was conducted by a few economists who were 
oriented towards the study of the social dimensions of economic growth. The 
pioneering work of R. Easterlin in 1974 which dealt with the relationship 
between income, happiness and economic growth, is a representative 
example of this minority attitude (see also Easterlin, 2004). Gradually though 
and especially in the last decade, the interest of economists in happiness has 
increased dramatically. There are three main reasons for this. The first has to 
do with the rise of positive psychology and its impact on other social science 
fields and thus on economics (see for instance, Snyder & Lopez, 2002). 
Another reason was the realization that in final analysis, the purpose of 
economic growth is the presumed overall increase in happiness levels. 
Finally, another reason that helped the promotion of happiness research was 
the realization that government intervention can help increase overall 
happiness by reducing unemployment and inequality levels (see also Layard, 
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2005a). Thus as one would expect, the focus of happiness research by 
economists is the study of the relationship between income and happiness.  
Traditionally, most economists believe that income has a positive 
impact on happiness and this is taken as obvious and common fact. There is 
almost universal agreement that the main aim of economics and economic 
policy is the raising of incomes so as to ultimately achieve higher levels of 
individual and aggregate happiness. This can also explain the emphasis on 
economic growth, given that the increase of incomes is attained through 
economic growth. Thus, the standard treatment found in many economic 
texts, is to assume that life satisfaction or happiness (U) is a function of 
income (y) and that life satisfaction is raised by income: 
 
U = U(y) with dU/dy > 0       (1) 
 
Many economic texts use the notions of total utility and life satisfaction 
interchangeably and do not provide a theoretical reason for the above relation 
(Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1980). In spite of its wide acceptance until recently, few 
economists had argued that the there is no straightforward relationship 
between the two constructs (see for instance, Frank, 1999; Scitovsky, 1976). 
Furthermore, it has been maintained that the relation between objective 
(income) and subjective well-being involves complicated methodological 
assumptions and requires interdisciplinary work in order to be understood 
properly (see Gasper, 2005).  
Given the above, there have been a large number of empirical studies 
examining the income – life satisfaction relationship within a single country at 
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a given moment in time but also across time and countries. Most studies start 
from the post war period and concentrate on the US and European countries. 
In the last few years, other countries are also the subject of empirical 
investigation (see for instance, Kenny, 2005). As these specialist studies 
began to proliferate, two general findings have emerged. The first one 
suggests that the relationship between income and happiness at a particular 
point in time and country is positive. This implies that higher income 
individuals, on average, report higher levels of happiness. Given that this 
relationship has been tested using simple and multiple regressions from 
various datasets, most specialists accept it as robust (for a review see Clark, 
Frijters, & Shields, 2008). This also supports the standard theoretical 
approach regarding the two variables. 
The second category of findings, however, was not in the direction of 
the theoretical expectations. In particular, many studies have indicated that 
increases of income over time do not correspond to equivalent increases in 
reported happiness (see Layard, 2005b). Furthermore, the income - 
happiness correlation across developed countries is very problematic 
revealing weak or zero income effects on happiness (Frey & Stutzer, 2002b). 
Clearly, the second set of findings is difficult to be reconciled with the first and 
with the standard theory, and for this reason it has been called the “paradox of 
happiness” (Bruni, 2002). 
One of the first studies to identify the paradox was Easterlin’s (1974), 
and for this reason it is also known as the “Easterlin paradox”. Easterlin’s 
study is based on post World War II US time series data and shows that 
although real per capita income has risen dramatically, there is no definite 
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trend on self-reported happiness level. This finding also holds for more recent 
studies. More specifically, many studies indicate that there has been no 
improvement in happiness in the US for over almost half a century although 
real income per capita more than doubled (Easterlin, 1995; Maddison, 1991). 
The findings for Japan are even more strange given the tremendous rise in 
real income. Although Japanese income increased by almost five times, there 
was no improvement in mean subjective well-being (Easterlin, 1995; Inglehart 
& Rabier, 1986). Similar results hold true for many European countries. There 
is almost no trend in a period where real income per capita rises within all 
these countries from 25 to 50% (Blanchflower & Oswald, 2004; Easterlin, 
1995; Kenny, 1999). The following figure presents the trend of life satisfaction 
in nine European countries. 
------------------Figure 1 about here-----------------------------------------  
However, the empirical evidence for less developed countries is more 
in line with the theoretical expectations. A survey of 22 countries indicates that 
the higher the gross national product, the lower the correlation between 
happiness and income (Veenhoven, 1991). More recent data from a world 
survey of country data shows that additional income provides more happiness 
at low levels of economic development (Frey & Stutzer, 2002b).  
With these empirical results in mind, some authors such as Easterlin 
(1995), Lane (2000), and Veenhoven (1991) have suggested that the 
relationship between income and happiness might be curvilinear. As Frey and 
Stutzer (2002b) state: 
“Income provides happiness at low levels of development, but once a 
certain threshold has been passed, income has little or no effect on 
happiness”  (p. 75).  
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This is also supported by the fact that for US data there is a positive 
correlation between income and happiness up to the average income level of 
US $10000 (see Frey & Stutzer, 2002b). Relative to this, the US population 
who felt "very happy" peaked in 1957 and has decreased since then, although 
real income has been increasing continuously (Schor, 1991). Furthermore, 
many cross-sectional empirical studies indicate that more developed countries 
do not report higher happiness levels once GDP per capita exceeds half that 
in the US in mid-1990s (see for  instance, Helliwell, 2003; Kenny, 1999). In a 
similar vein, there is evidence that when a country’s income per head is below 
the threshold level of $15000, countries with higher per capita income seem to 
be happier than those with lower per capita income (Layard, 2005b). In 
general, the curvilinear nature of the income - happiness relationship is 
currently recognized by many specialists, and it is also supported by many 
empirical studies (for a review see Inglehart, Foa, Peterson, & Welzel, 2008). 
However, there is no universal agreement for a theoretical explanation of the 
curvilinear relationship, but, as we shall see, the hierarchical and the income 
comparisons approaches might serve as a basis. 
 
3. Explanations of the Paradox 
 
Given the controversial nature of the relationship between income and 
happiness over time and also of the cross-country studies, it is not surprising 
that there have been a number of explanations regarding the paradoxical 
relationship between income and happiness. As one would expect, one 
reaction was to challenge the empirical findings. Stevenson and Wolfers 
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(2008), for instance, dismiss the long-term evidence for Japan as a result of 
changes in survey questions. However, many specialists seem to agree that 
many of the above empirical findings concerning the paradox have stood 
many reliability tests using various econometric methods (Blanchflower & 
Oswald, 2004; Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Frijters, 2004; Myers & Diener, 1995). A 
similar criticism focuses on the semantic aspect: the meaning of the word 
“happiness” might differ among languages. However, research using bilingual 
and multilingual participants as well as different stated preferences ranking 
measures, suggests that language is not a significant factor (Cummins, 2003; 
Layard, 2005a; Veenhoven, 2000).  
Apart from the above reactions, researchers have attempted to tackle 
the paradox by focusing on the components of happiness. More specifically, 
they argue that a number of non-economic and economic variables affect the 
level of happiness (Frey & Stutzer, 2002a, 2002b). Such variables can be 
social capital, relational goods, lacking of goals, economic inequality and 
unemployment, among others. In particular, it has been pointed out that the 
deterioration of social capital (trusting people, friendship) in many advanced 
countries might be a crucial factor for the paradox of happiness (Bjornskov, 
2003; Putnam, 2000). Similar to this line of explanation is the idea of relational 
goods (for a discussion of this concept, see Sugden, 2002). The main 
argument here is that the lack of relational goods such as close personal 
relationships might be common in advanced countries and this may reduce 
overall well-being (Pugno, 2009). This approach also draws from current work 
in psychology (see for instance Ash, 2000; Gui, 2000; Pugno, 2005). Lacking 
of goals, active interests, and meaning (or boredom) have also been 
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proposed as explanations for the observed high levels of unhappiness 
although incomes were high (Scitovsky, 1976; Loewestein, 1999). The 
concept of freedom has also been connected with the level of well-being. In 
particular, the three main dimensions of freedom -political, economic and 
personal- have been found to exhibit a positive relationship with happiness in 
many countries (Veenhoven, 2000). For Phelps (2001), the paradox of 
happiness in the US is attributed to a decline in the percentage of altruists in 
the population. This is because altruists are more likely to report themselves 
happy than people with other personality attributes.  
Finally, a number of economic variables have been used in order to 
explain the paradox. The level of income inequality and unemployment are 
among the main ones that have been suggested. The basis of the negative 
effects of inequality is the concept of diminishing marginal utility of money: an 
extra dollar provides much more utility to a poor than to a rich person. This 
implies that if there is a transfer of money from the rich to the poor, average 
happiness increases. Thus, the more equally income is distributed, the higher 
the level of happiness level in a country (Alesina et al., 2004; see also Layard, 
2005a). The level of unemployment has also been found to negatively affect 
happiness levels given that apart from the obvious individual costs, 
unemployment leads to social problems that affect society as a whole (Di 
Tella,  MacCulloch,  & Oswald  2003). 
 All of the above explanations to the paradox of happiness no doubt, 
contribute to our understanding of the complex relationship between income 
and happiness. They all have empirical support and some backing from 
research in psychology and sociology (for further discussion see Layard, 
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2005a). In spite of this, however, many leading researchers in the field still 
claim that these approaches are not adequate in explaining the paradox. As 
Frey and Stutzer (2002b) state: “The causal factors that relate wealth to 
happiness, however, are not yet fully understood” (p. 76). This is mainly due 
to some recent empirical findings and some conceptual problems which 
undermine the above explanations. For instance, social relations have been 
found to account for only a fraction of the initial variance of life satisfaction 
(Ehrhardt, Saris, & Veenhoven, 2000). As far as inequality is concerned, there 
is recent evidence that some groups treat it as a feature of their environment 
and have a positive attitude towards it. In particular, when individuals focus on 
other people’s circumstances, extra income might have a strong positive 
effect on life satisfaction even for high levels of income. This can reduce the 
effect of the diminishing marginal utility of money mentioned above. This 
holds true especially for groups who exhibit a large variation of their income 
mainly due to higher job mobility (Clark, 2003). In addition, inequality may also 
affect social relationships and this complicates further its impact on happiness 
level (Helliwell, 2003).  
It seems that a combination of economic and non-economic factors 
might shed more light to the paradox. For this reason, in the next two sections 
we concentrate on the idea of needs hierarchy and the role of income 
comparisons.  
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4. The needs hierarchy approach 
 
Many authors consider the psychologist A. Maslow as the basic proponent of 
the needs hierarchy (Maslow, 1954, and also Alderfer, 1969, with less 
emphasis on hierarchy though). Today, the idea of needs hierarchy can be 
found in social sciences such as psychology, politics and sociology (see for 
instance, Ardrey, 1970; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Doyal & Gough, 1984; Levi, 1986; 
Tversky, 1969). Furthermore, although this approach has not made a 
substantial impact to the established contemporary economic theory of 
choice, a number of influential economists like Little (1957), Encarnacion 
(1964), Georgescu-Roegen (1966), and Day (1971) have long emphasized 
the importance of needs hierarchy for choice theory. Furthermore, Earl 
(1986), Falkinger (1990), Pfouts (2002), Lavoie (2004) and others have 
recently discussed hierarchical-type preferences (for a review see 
Drakopoulos, 1994; Drakopoulos & Karayiannis, 2004).  
The standard approach to economic rationality assumes that economic 
agents engage in full substitutability which means that all preferences can be 
substituted fully. To take an example, food can in theory be substituted 
completely for perfume. This approach is in contrast to needs hierarchy. The 
conceptual basis of hierarchical choice is that human needs are of varying 
importance and that they are hierarchical. Primary needs must reach a given 
level of satisfaction first before the secondary ones are considered. In other 
words, preferences are hierarchical in the sense that higher priority choice 
variables must reach certain levels before lower priority choice variables are 
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considered (for a discussion of the definition of primary and secondary needs, 
see Gasper, 2005; Max-Neef, 1995).  
It must be noted that hierarchical needs – related behavior manifests 
itself quite strongly in many empirical studies of consumption patterns. In 
particular, the hierarchical approach predicts that when income is low, a very 
high percentage of it would be spent on food since food satisfies a basic 
need. (A detailed analysis of the role of income and substitution effects in the 
hierarchical model can be found in Lavoie, 2004). There are numerous 
empirical studies which indicate a significant and positive impact of household 
income on food variety. This is in line with the hypothesis that consumption 
evolves along a hierarchical order as income increases (for relevant empirical 
work in a number of countries, see for instance, Canterbery, 1979; Jackson & 
Marks, 1999;  Lluch, Powel, & Ross, 1977; Thiele & Weiss, 2003). The same 
pattern of behavior is observed with respect to the saving patterns which is 
the mirror image of consumption (Canova, Rattazzi, & Webley, 2005; Xiao & 
Noring, 1994).  
The incorporation of needs hierarchy in the framework of happiness 
research can provide some interesting insights. The standard approach to an 
individual's happiness level or life satisfaction is given as: 
 
U = U (y, z)               (2) 
 
where U is happiness level or life satisfaction, y is the level of income and z is 
a vector of characteristics comprising variables that affect life satisfaction. 
There is no accepted list of these variables but as we saw it can include 
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social capital, social aspiration, freedom, emotions, goal completion and 
meaning (Clark et al., 2008). These variables may or may not affect income. 
 There is also no agreement concerning the conceptual basis of 
happiness or life satisfaction. More specifically, there are two main 
approaches: the hedonic and the eudaimonic conceptions. The hedonic 
viewpoint defines well-being in terms of pleasure seeking and pain avoidance 
and thus the basic criterion for happiness is hedonic well-being. The 
eudaimonic approach focuses on meaning, self-development and functioning, 
and the basic criterion for happiness is eudaimonic well-being (Ryan & Deci, 
2001; Waterman, 1993). Both approaches have convergent and divergent 
aspects but are distinguishable in the sense that according to the eudaimonic 
approach pleasure attainment alone should not be identified with happiness. 
The philosophical roots of these approaches can be found in Ancient Greek 
philosophers and also in the Utilitarianism of J. Bentham and J.S. Mill (for a 
discussion, see Drakopoulos, 1991). Modern psychological theories like self-
determination theory attempt to reconcile the two approaches by identifying 
three fundamental psychological needs which, if satisfied, result in both 
hedonic and eudaimonic well-being (Ryan & Deci, 2000).   
The incorporation of needs hierarchy into a happiness or life 
satisfaction framework implies that the individual has a priority approach to 
life satisfaction. This means that the most important variables must be 
satisfied first before the second priority variable comes into the picture. In 
terms of hedonic and eudaimonic well-being, the hierarchical approach fits 
better with the latter. The multi-dimensional character of the eudaimonic 
approach might be accommodated better with an ordered structure of needs 
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that hierarchical choice implies (see also Drakopoulos, 1994). This idea is 
also supported by empirical findings by a number of job satisfaction (a major 
determinant of life satisfaction) specialists (see for instance, Clark & Oswald, 
1996;  Drakopoulos & Theodossiou, 1997; Locke, 1976).  
The application of the hierarchical system in a life satisfaction 
framework can be the following: we take a simple life satisfaction vector: 
 
U = (y,y*,z)      (3)  
 
where y is the most important variable which can be income, y* is the 
aspiration or target level of income which can be determined by a number of 
factors, and z is the secondary variable which can represent a vector of other  
variables affecting life satisfaction. The target level of income y* satisfies the 
basic needs and its inclusion in equation (2) reflects the essence of hierarchy; 
(for a discussion concerning the determination of y*, see Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 
2005). The other variables (z) satisfy secondary needs and are taken into 
consideration only when y reaches a satisfactory level or target y*. We can 
incorporate all the above by taking a two-part life satisfaction function: 
      
U(y,z) = {U1 (y,z), U2 (y,z)}      (4) 
 
where     U(y,z) = U1  for y < y*  
and       U(y,z) = U2 for  y > y* 
with the following conditions:  
∂U1/∂y > 0,   ∂U2/∂y > 0      and 
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∂U1/∂y > ∂U2/∂y                                   
 
The conditions provide the essence of the hierarchical approach to life 
satisfaction. The first two conditions imply that income has a positive effect on 
life satisfaction. The last condition indicates that income does not provide the 
same rate of satisfaction once a given level (y*) has been reached (although it 
continues to have a positive effect).  
One potential difficulty with the empirical dimension of the hierarchical 
system might be the definition of basic needs. However, it has been 
maintained that needs lower in the hierarchy are likely to be common among 
individuals of different cultures, and that needs higher in the hierarchy are 
likely to be common among individuals of the same culture (see Georgescu-
Roegen, 1966; Little, 1957; Max-Neef,  1995).  
 The above formulation of happiness can be used as an additional 
explanation of the observed curvilinear relation between income and 
happiness: income has strong impact on happiness but after a certain income 
level, the effect becomes much weaker.  
 
5. Income comparisons 
 
 
As was mentioned above, a strand of literature towards explaining the 
happiness paradox focuses on “missing” economic variables. One idea which 
has been suggested is that of income comparisons. The idea that individuals 
compare their income to the income of similar individuals belongs to the 
general theoretical framework of reward comparisons. The general notion of 
comparing rewards with others has a long and persistent presence in the social 
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sciences and in particular in many psychological, social and managerial 
theories. Examples of theories where the idea of comparing rewards is central 
are: social comparison theory, reference group theory, relative deprivation 
theory, adaptation level theory, dissonance theory, and equity theory (see for 
instance, Adams, 1963; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Festinger, 1954; Greenberg, 1990; 
Martin, 1981; for surveys see Earl, 1990, and Kapteyn & Wansbeek, 1982). 
The main thrust of the income comparisons argument in the context of 
happiness research is that individuals do not extract much happiness from their 
absolute income but from their position relative to other people’s incomes. In 
terms of the life satisfaction framework that was used above, this implies:  
 
U = (y,yc,z)                (5) 
 
with  ∂U/∂y  > 0 and  
∂U/∂yc < 0 
 
where yc is the “comparison income” or the “reference group income”. The 
negative sign of the last relation, shows that life satisfaction falls as the income 
of the relevant reference group increases. Thus, raising everybody’s income 
does not necessarily increase general happiness. This is because in 
comparison to others, income has not improved (Andrews, 1991; Easterlin, 
1974, 2001; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Frank, 1985, 1999; Kenny, 1999; 
Veenhoven, 1991). A similar line of thought has to do with the changing income 
aspirations. More specifically, it has been argued that aspirations change over 
the life-cycle roughly in proportion to income and this means that they have 
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offsetting effects on happiness levels. According to this outlook, happiness 
level has a positive relationship with current income but a negative one with 
aspirations about future income. Moreover, aspirations are based on past 
income. Given that material aspirations change over life cycle in proportion to 
income, it is likely that happiness level remains constant while income rises. 
The main example of this approach is the work of Easterlin but it also draws 
from work in psychology (Easterlin, 2001; Inglehart, 1990; Kahneman, Wakker, 
& Sarin, 1997).  
The idea of comparison or relative income is quite important in 
economics and has been used in many theoretical contexts (Drakopoulos, 
2011; Lommerud, 1989)1. It was first suggested as a possible way of explaining 
the paradox by Easterlin (1974). The same author uses it in a later paper 
(Easterlin, 2001), in which he elaborates on the idea of income aspirations in 
relation to actual income. A number of empirical papers have focused on the 
empirical testing of the idea in relation to happiness at both the individual and 
the aggregate level. On individual happiness, McBride (2001) presents an 
empirical analysis to test for the effect of an individual's own income, past 
financial situation, and cohort (reference) income on subjective well-being. 
McBride (2001) finds that the higher the income of the peers, the less satisfied 
is the individual. Similar findings are presented in a relatively early paper by 
Tomes (1986) which utilizes social - psychological measures of happiness and 
satisfaction.  
There are numerous empirical studies on the aggregate level. A recent 
study by Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) investigates happiness in the 
                                                 
1
 In some  formal specifications y is income, yc is called reference group or comparison 
income, while the ratio y/yc is called relative income (see also Clark, Frijters & Shields, 2008). 
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United States and Great Britain. Apart from confirming the existence of the 
happiness paradox for US and UK, the authors find that people care about 
comparison income. They also find indications that income is still important for 
lower income groups. Similar results are found by other empirical papers 
concentrating on the US (Luttmer, 2005), Latin America (Graham & Felton, 
2006), Canada (Helliwell & Huang, 2005) but also for emerging economies 
like China (Knight, Song, & Gunatilaka, 2009). The gist of these works is that 
life satisfaction or happiness is largely relative in income. Finally, a survey of 
empirical research on happiness and income shows a clear connection 
between income comparisons and happiness levels. As Frey and Stutzer 
(2002b) write: “It is not the absolute level of income that matters most but 
rather one’s position relative to other individuals” (p. 411; see also Ferrer-i-
Carbonell,  2005). 
The concept of income comparisons has also attracted criticism given 
that there is no universal agreement about the income group that people 
compare themselves within the relative income hypothesis (Sousa-Poza & 
Sousa-Poza, 2000; but see also the discussion in Rablen, 2008). However, 
the relative income approaches to the paradox might be enhanced (and 
respond more adequately to criticism) if a hierarchical system is also taken 
into account. The hierarchical approach implies that happiness depends only 
partly in comparisons. Basic needs cannot be substituted and this limits the 
human capacity for adaptability. As Root Veenhoven (1991) states: “To a 
great extent happiness depends on the gratification of innate bio-
psychological needs which do not adjust to circumstances” (p. 32). 
Comparisons and adaptation are important once the basic needs are met. 
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Therefore, further increases of income do not result in equivalent increases 
on happiness because people start comparing their income with the income 
of similar individuals, and this implies that their absolute income is not as 
important as before. Thus, a combination of the two approaches might 
contribute towards a more complete understanding of the paradox of 
happiness.  
 
6. Concluding comments 
 
According to most economists, income is among the most important 
determinants of happiness. This is also supported by many empirical studies 
which focus at a particular point in time and country. However, the 
relationship is problematic given that there is ample evidence that increases 
of income over time do not correspond to equivalent increases in reported 
happiness and this is the central idea of the paradox of happiness. There 
have been a number of explanations of the paradox which include economic 
and non-economic considerations.  
The basic aim of this chapter was to highlight two concepts which 
might enhance further our understanding of the income - happiness 
relationship. More specifically, it suggested that the combination of the notion 
of needs hierarchy and of comparison income can shed more light to the 
issue. Hierarchical choice has been studied by many social scientists and has 
been applied in a wide variety of social and economic issues. The notion of 
comparison income belongs to general theoretical framework of reward 
comparisons. Both needs hierarchy and income comparisons have  strong 
empirical support in many studies across a number of fields. After a 
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discussion of the characteristics of the two concepts in the context of 
happiness research, the present chapter argued that their combination might 
explain many empirical results that point to the happiness paradox. In 
particular, empirical studies indicate that income might be very important 
variable in providing happiness up to a certain level. After that level has been 
reached, it ceases to do so and other variables become important. In other 
words, there exists a curvilinear relationship between the two variables: 
income has a positive relationship with happiness up to a certain level of 
income but the relationship weakens after that level. The theoretical 
implications of needs hierarchy and comparison income mean that income is 
very important for happiness up to the satisfaction of basic needs. People 
start comparing their income after the basic needs have been met. Thus, 
further increases of income do not result in equivalent increases on 
happiness because people start focusing on comparing their income with the 
income of other people rather than on their absolute income. The same 
argument holds when there is a fall in average income: happiness levels will 
also fall but not to the same extent, unless the reduction in income is so 
substantial as to affect basic needs satisfaction. One can also get an insight 
of these points from the recent economic recession in the US and Europe in 
2008. Some preliminary studies indicate that due to average income drop, 
overall reported happiness has also dropped but not to the same extent as 
income (see Stellar, 2011). This finding also implies that income is not very 
important for happiness when basic needs are satisfied and when people 
compare their incomes. 
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Thus, although many studies have concentrated on suggesting a 
number of variables which might account for the happiness paradox, a 
combination of the above two notions might be a way forward towards a more 
complete understanding of the complex relationship between income and 
happiness. 
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Figure 1: Trend Average Happiness in EU9 Nations 
 
Weighted average of first 9 member states of the European Union 1973-2009  
The population weights are about as follows (1995):  
Belgium 0.037  
France 0.215  
(West)Germany 0.234  
Ireland 0.015  
Italy 0.207  
Luxembourg 0.002  
Netherlands 0.058  
Denmark 0.019  
United Kingdom 0.212 
 
Source: Veenhoven (2011) 
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